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Abstract 
Early Warning Identity Threat and Mitigation System 
Aditya Tyagi, MSE 
The University of Texas at Austin, 2021 
Supervisor:  Suzanne Barber 
While many organizations share threat intelligence, there is still a lack of actionable 
data for organizations to proactively and effectively respond to emerging identity threats 
to mitigate a wide range of crimes. There currently exists no solution for organizations to 
access current trends and intelligence to understand emerging threats and how to 
appropriately respond to them.  This research project delivers I-WARN, to help bridge that 
gap. Using a wide range of open-source information, I-WARN gathers, analyzes, and 
reports on threats related to the theft, fraud, and abuse of Personal Identifiable Information 
(PII). Then maps those threats to the MITRE ATT&CK framework to offer mitigation and 
risk reduction tactics. I-WARN aims to deliver actionable intelligence, offering early 
warning into threat behaviors, and mitigation responses.  This thesis discusses the technical 
details of I-WARN, current solutions for threat intelligence sharing with how they compare 
to I-WARN, and future work.  
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
This research offers early warning of identity threats along with proactive 
mitigation and response tactics to better equip organizations with the situation awareness 
and response tools necessary to thwart and combat identity crimes.   
This chapter overviews significant advances in threat intelligence as offered by this 
research and captured in the delivered I-WARN system. I-WARN offers timely threat 
information sharing and delivers timely actionable intelligence for decision-makers by 
leveraging a wealth of information and expertise found in the University of Texas Center 
for Identity’s (UT CID) Identity Threat Assessment and Prediction (ITAP) [13], the 
MITRE ATT&CK framework and a wide range of open sources. 
With the world getting smaller through growing cyberspace, being connected with 
someone on the other side of the globe has never been easier. Unfortunately, that 
connectedness is used as an exploit. Digital footprints are becoming more exposed to the 
public; individuals and organizations are encouraged to understand the risk of exposure 
their identity-related tokens hold. 
This research focuses on attacks relating with Personally Identifiable Information 
(PII): attributes of personal data vulnerable to reveal sensitive information about an 
individual. We also focus on other sensitive information such as financial records, 
healthcare records, and affiliated business records. When discussing intelligence about 
different attacks relating to PII, some of the prominent ones are as follows: 
 Identity theft: attacks that lead to loss of sensitive, personal information that can be 
used as keys to access other information such as financial records. Examples of stolen 
attributes in such attacks can include stolen Social Security Number, date of birth, etc.  
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 Social Engineering: attacks that lure victims into sharing their personal data by 
impersonating or creating a synthetic identity. 
 Phishing: attacks that target victims through emails and phone calls to create a sense of 
urgency in divulging PII or other sensitive information. This attack could be used as a 
gateway to further attack an organization or for financial incentives. 
 Ransomware: attacks that lock up an organization’s services through intrusion-based 
software and hold the company at ransom. Ransomware primarily used for financial 
gain and can be an induced attack through phishing emails and other malware infected 
links. 
 Malware injection: malicious software that is inserted into a target device without the 
target user’s knowledge. These attacks are then used to gain sensitive information that 
could again be used as a gateway to further intrude an organization.  
THREAT INTELLIGENCE: CONCEPT 
Threat Intelligence enables individuals and organizations take a preemptive 
approach to their cybersecurity defenses as the newfound knowledge arms them with the 
ability to prioritize defending against attacks, should an attacker take any action against 
them.  
Information characterizing threats are often extremely noisy – there is irrelevant or 
incomplete data – and ineffective, overwhelming, and is likely in-actionable [1]. However, 
when an organization can collect, process, and analyze the given information from the 
sources to understand different attributes about the attacker, such as motives, targets, and 
patterns, it falls under the field of Threat Intelligence [2].  
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Threat Intelligence empowers the defending organization by introducing them to 
new vectors of attack, the attackers’ patterns, motives as well as technical knowledge, and 
enabling them to make better decisions about prioritizations and risk mitigation tactics. 
Threat Intelligence, in current industry practice, falls under three categories: Strategic, 
Tactical, and Operational [3]. We utilize a running example, such as company X, to 
reaffirm the distinctions of threat intelligence categories.  
Strategic Intelligence ensures organizations and business understand the executive-
level decisions that need to be made based on high-level analysis. Most sources for such 
intelligence are through open-source inputs, for example, media outlets, online reports, etc. 
In our instance for company X, the Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) and other 
executive-level officers find information, such as white papers and other non-technical 
sources, that give a glimpse of high-level information and trends very useful to make high-
level decision.  
Additionally, Tactical Intelligence is more granular than high-level analysis as it 
serves to make technical decisions about the organization’s defending systems and whether 
they can deter the immediate threats. Such intelligence takes inputs from IOCs: Indicators 
of Compromise comprise of technical, forensic evidence which could indicate an attack or 
infection [4]. These could include any number of details, such as virus signatures, URLs 
of malicious web pages, IPs of attackers, etc. Company X’s security team leads would often 
find this information vital. This intelligence would include reports from the company’s 
security vendors to understand where resources would need to focus for prevention and 
mitigation response.  
Lastly, Operational Intelligence answers the immediate questions of who is 
affected, how are they affected, and what is being used. This intelligence is often utilized 
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to understand the context on various factors such as motivation, attack vectors, and any 
other patterns. Enough Operational Intel is gained from learning more about ongoing cyber 
incidents or any prior incidents an organization has had to face. Daily, company X’s 
Security Operations Center (SOC) would filter incoming data through various feeds and 
start drilling down more on the true-positive events.  
With these categories of intelligence, and given appropriate consolidation of such 
intelligence, an organization can have actionable data which can be utilized effectively to 
strengthen defenses through prioritization of risk mitigation tactics, deterrence of initial 
attack vectors, or overall investing in stronger system security. 
INFORMATION SHARING AND ITS FACILITATION 
As the every-growing interconnectivity increases, information sharing as part of 
threat intelligence exchange has become extremely vital. With new knowledge gained 
about certain attacks from one part of the nation or world, it is imperative that other 
defending organizations are made aware of such new attacks in timely manner to ensure 
detrimental effects of such attacks are mitigated, if not deterred.  
Often, the idea of information sharing or knowledge sharing in cybersecurity realm 
is misunderstood [5]. Current industry practices make the organizations reluctant to sharing 
any proprietary information publicly, which could potentially give advantage to their 
competitors. However, information sharing can also be divided into the 3 levels of 
intelligence – Strategic, Tactical, and Operational – as stated by Luiijf et al. [5]. The 
information shared usually relates to possible incident response steps that can be taken 
rather than organizational decisions made as part of escalation.  
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There has been industry exploration into improving cyber security information 
sharing. Dandurand et al. [14] explored the requirements for the Cyber Security Data 
Exchange and Collaboration Infrastructure (CDXI). The requirements provided the 
formalized guidelines for private market sectors and how their data would adhere to 
controlled multilateral sharing which could be customizable based on the information an 
organization is comfortable sharing. Further, to make it more versatile, one of the other key 
requirements for CDXI is to be machine-readable and have a human-friendly view to 
ensure cybersecurity information is viewable by members of an organization with and 
without technical knowledge. It gives room for nontechnical stories to come from 
organizations that do not specialize in the security field, thereby increasing parts of the 
organization that absorb such information.  
Although there are plenty of different anonymization procedures and safe haven 
policies for private and public information storing, the fluid exchange of information 
between the United States industries and the US federal government has been rather slow.  
However, with the rise of digital dependency in the current US infrastructure and the risks 
they can present [6], the US government had to further facilitate knowledge transfer 
through incentivized voluntarily information exchange. Under the Obama Administration, 
the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act of 2015 was passed to further this agenda [7]. 
With the law in place, federal government assures more protections to the private industry 
in exchange for sharing their threat indicators – technical knowledge such as IOCs – and 
their implemented defensive measures. These protections include protection from 
disclosure, protection from liability, protections from misuse, etc.  
Through such encouragement of knowledge and intelligence sharing, non-profit 
organizations such as MITRE have stepped up to take advantage of the federal funding and 
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partnerships between the public and private industries to ensure that such partnerships, 
through open sharing of such intelligence, aids in a safer cyberspace for industries and 
nations [8]. Like Luiijf et al. [5], MITRE has implemented a matrix – the ATT&CK Matrix 
– suggesting lists of possible horizontal movement throughout the incident response for 
any given cyber incident [9], as seen in Figure 1. The attack usually moves from an 
intrusion-based attack to exfiltration. MITRE’s framework aids the reader in understanding 
the possible next steps the attacker would take to laterally move in the target system which 
can create an impact. It also divides each attack into threat tactics, threat techniques, and 
mitigation tactics. While threat tactic gives an overall picture of the type of attack, 
techniques describe the more technical details about how the bad actor intends to breach 
the system. Since the possibility of giving information about vertical response to an 
incident can be too narrowed due to the different access level controls each organization 
has, leaning towards impracticality, there are possible issues of exposing proprietary 
information about business decisions from the public and private sector which should be 
protected. It should be noted that alerts from the United States CISA currently apply the 
MITRE mitigation and detection techniques, indicating the matrix is being actively used in 







Figure 1: A Snippet from the MITRE ATT&CK framework where cyber incidents are 
linked to more detail and their lateral incident response tactics [10]. 
OPPORTUNITIES FROM INFORMATION SHARING FACILITATION 
With a rise of information sharing between private industries and the federal 
sectors, we have seen a surge in information provided through journalism and other media 
outlets. This information is conventionally classified as Open-Source Intelligence 
(OSINT): information which is available publicly and is encouraged to be used and shared 
for the betterment of the cyber communities [11]. There are multiple types of OSINT 
outlets, and for the purposes of this research, we are focusing on the media outlets. Aside 
from the aggregated reports released in media, news media also covers different stories 
shared through mediums such as newspapers, online articles, television, and radios [12]. 
Other forms of informal sources for OSINT include Long-Form and Short-Form Social 
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Media Content which includes different threads on cyber incidents through websites such 
as Reddit and alerts and further news development on social media such as Facebook, 
respectively.  Although OSINT – especially from media – is very effective as part of 
knowledge sharing, one of the severe limitations is the lack of technical details due to the 
jargon it introduces, inhibiting regular readers from understanding the context. This, in 
turn, results in less technical details for defending teams when parsing through the OSINT. 
With an easier access to such outlets and artificial attempts to further boost 
information sharing and promote a sense of transparency, there is opportunity to turn such 
information into actionable data. The University of Texas’s Center for Identity has utilized 
such open-source intel and created the Identity Threat Assessment and Prediction (ITAP) 
Model [13]. ITAP utilizes OSINT such as news stories and personal stories to aggregate 
data on exposure of PII and the market sector from where the attacks have been reported 
from. Though not actionable data, the ITAP model aims to visualize the patterns and a 
higher-level analysis by providing Strategic Intelligence and extract vital information from 
the different stories. ITAP is covered in more detail later and is one of the many examples 
of how readily available OSINT and other informal sources can be tapped for information 
related to threat intelligence in any of the three categories described above.  
This research focuses on utilizing such sources to provide actionable data which 
can be added to the knowledge databases of market sector leads who are actively interested 
in learning more from different outlets of threat intelligence and act on any preventive and 






Chapter 2:  Related Work 
This chapter entails the current work conducted through facilitation of information 
sharing. We describe the current processes of creating a safer cyberspace and various 
aspects where they are flawed.  
There has been previous academic work in the “blue team” sectors – teams in 
organization that focus on defending from various cyber threats – that focus on helping 
organizations understand the different trends and cyber incidents (not including significant 
cyber incidents, as described by Presidential Policy Directive-41 [15]). Although most 
resources discussed in the chapter covers work within the United States, some notable 
related efforts across the globe are acknowledged. 
INFORMATION SHARING OUTSIDE OF THE UNITED STATES 
Throughout the world, dedicated cyber operations commands of each nation act to 
ensure that aggregated information is passed down as part of declassified information from 
the government intelligence. For example, The Australian Cyber Security Centre issues 
surveys on annual basis that sends out aggregated information about the types, frequency, 
and impact of reported cyber incidents [16]. Although the report is extremely 
comprehensive which also includes incidents from different types of OSINT outlets, as 
discussed in the previous chapter and the type of impact faced by the incident, it fails to 
provide any data to encourage vigilance for specific market sectors. The survey also does 
not distinguish between incidents relating to individuals and organizations. Further, the 
granularity on each incident is ambiguous with no indication of the duration of attack or 
any countermeasure taken. This, therefore, depicts an unclear picture about the timeline of 
any incident and any response to it.  
10 
 
On a global collaborative scale, The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 
has attempted to share educational information about the different frameworks – as well as 
possible mitigation tactics from different attack vectors [17]. NATO shares their 
educational framework for the purposes of facilitating skill-based information for cyber-
security professional all over the world. Since NATO does not entail or cater to one specific 
nation, the organization does not provide any data on any incidents that pertain to any 
nation. Furthermore, due to the ambiguity of international laws that are fostered due to lack 
of common objectives by influencing powers, such as the United States, China, and Russia 
[18], NATO lacks explicit powers on either side of the cyber security terrain, thereby 
refraining it from having any concrete methodologies to respond to attack vectors that can 
be applied in multiple nations, adhering to the nation’s set of laws. Although it serves the 
public with important information to further nurture incoming cyber security professionals 
by creating technical educational frameworks, as well as aiding in deciphering any 
international law pertaining to the issue, NATO does not share information that relate to 
non-state actors. 
WITHIN US: FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Within the United States, the federal government has established forces in the law 
enforcement and executive branch, such as The Federal Bureau of Investigation (with 
Department of Justice) and United States Secret Service, that have dedicated cybercrime 
branches to keep the domestic organizations and civilian population safe. 
FBI’s Cyber Investigation team works closely with local law enforcement in its 
field offices. With the given coverage, individuals can request aid for incidents through 
FBI’s Internet Crime Complaint Center (IC3) [19] while organizations can contact law 
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enforcement and federal agents as need be. Focusing on the IC3, FBI also aims to release 
the information collected about incidents that were reported. The Bureau releases certain 
attributes of the reported incidents such as basic demographic information, estimated 
financial impact, and types of cybercrimes that occurred [21]. However, like other cyber 
security centers around the globe, the reports do not provide any mitigation responses as 
well as market sector specific trends that could indicate patterns for market sector leads as 
they parse through the reports. Further, FBI admits that due to the report only accounting 
for reported complaints, only 12% of actual cyber incidents are being captured by the 
reports [20]. This further undermines the captured trends in the report as compared to other 
OSINT sources, such as individual media outlets for individual cases.  
FBI also utilizes another tool, labeled as iGuardian [22], as an industry-focused 
cyber intrusion system. It is actively used when law enforcement is involved for an incident 
involving organization (especially critical infrastructures as defined by CISA [23]). 
However, since there is no publicly available information available, this research does not 
relate to the findings of the tool.  
Moreover, the federal government also utilizes Secret Service Cyber Investigations 
to primarily focus on financial market sector and cyber security cases related to it [24]. 
Secret Service does provide generalized information from their knowledge database on 
various cyber incidents and how to respond to them, but due to the nature of the cases they 
are assigned, there is no declassified report of the trends and any other aggregated report 
available online for the general populace to view. The media outreach team of the Secret 
Service does release information about recently concluded cyber investigations, but do not 
reveal all the information needed for further prevention of such incidents.  
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Additionally, US Department of Justice also aids in releasing reports to address the 
different cybercrimes trends and statistics, through the Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) 
[40,41] in aiding the US populace understand the different demographics of the victims 
involved in such crimes. However, the intention of such reports is to inform the public of 
annual trends and not to make any decisions. The reports provide a general cause of these 
cyber and information crimes, such as lack of anti-virus software, and derive the percentage 
of incidents caused by it. However, they do not provide any recommendation – implicit or 
explicit – to deter such attacks as a member of any organization or individual. The primary 
focus of BJS reports is to share Justice Department’s information database in statistical 
manner that citizens can further analyze and make decisions with, as part of Strategic 
Intelligence.  
Overall, the federal reports and media press released by federal law enforcement 
organizations provide data to the public and organizations that is statistically interesting. 
Also, the data provided is reactive rather than preventive: information from the shared data 
cannot be used for any prevention, but rather results of action that are too late.  
WITHIN US: CISA ALERTS 
Although the reports provided aggregated yet no actionable data, the Cybersecurity 
and Infrastructure Security Agency provides time-sensitive and actionable alerts for the 
general public as well as the organizations to view and digest as they see fit [25].  CISA 
alerts follow the MITRE ATT&CK framework analysis (discussed in the previous section) 
that ensures a mitigation response as well as detection techniques are easily understandable 
due to easy access to the ATT&CK framework. Figure 2 depicts one of the recent alerts 
from the ATT&CK framework. The framework aids in understanding the impact of the 
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attack, possible detection approaches, as well as structured incident response to it. Further, 
CISA also includes the market sector of interest with their alerts. For instance, CISA would 
title alerts related to educational institutions with the keyword “Education”, as can been 
seen with alert AA20-345A, that intuitively lets the reader focus on their market sector of 
interest.  
Although the alerts pushed by CISA are of industry and organizational interests, 
the agency does not use openly available information that pertains to incidents to domestic 
and local cyber incidents. With the federal government focusing on incidents that are of 
national security interest, actionable alerts would not cover domestic incidents such as 
social engineering or small ransomware cases as compared to local media. The coverage, 
therefore, is limited to alerts that involve advanced persistent threats and nation state actors 
that attempt to jeopardize the cybersecurity infrastructure for critical or large-scale 




Figure 2: A snippet from the CISA Alert AA20-258A showing MITRE ATT&CK 
implementation, facilitating easier diffusion of information between CISA 
and the public [26].  
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WITHIN US: ACADEMIC WORK IN INFORMATION SHARING 
Aside from the federal government, other organizations are also involved with the 
community through information sharing and helping in creating better defenses for 
everyone in the cyberspace.  
There has been academic exploration on how to integrate the ATT&CK framework 
when supplying IOCs and its related information. From technical viewpoints, Farooq and 
Otaibi [37] depict multiple examples of utilizing machine learning (ML) and associating 
ML use cases with the ATT&CK framework, notably for the Exfiltration detection 
techniques. The authors present K-Means clusters and relate them to a quadrant that is 
based off the Exfiltration techniques to detect user activity and any potential signs for 
malicious software injections or data leakage in forms of Command and Control, covert 
channels, etc. The work provides detail in mimicking the detection techniques for any 
organization’s SOC although it does not provide any testing criteria or compare accuracies 
from open databases. However, such information sharing on detection is exceptionally 
important to integrate with industry standards of attack techniques and behavior because 
of the novel cases seen by organizations, enabling their SOCs to detect IOCs attacking their 
organization. 
Similarly, there has been previous work in surveying current cyber-attack 
emulators such as Red Team Automation [39] with the ATT&CK framework in sharing 
more information from the attacker’s perspective [38] where the authors assess the 
highlights of its (and other simulators’) scripts while looking at the implementation based 
on the ATT&CK mapping. Through the surveys, the audience gets more information about 
utilizing best emulators to create scenarios and test out their abilities for deterrence and 
mitigation tactics based on the ATT&CK framework.  
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With more open news outlets (as part of OSINT), such as Twitter and 0day.today, 
non-federal organizations have also been able to aggregate the data coming in for the 
purposes of information sharing that is not regulated by the government. For instance, The 
University of Texas’s Identity Threat Assessment and Prediction reports [27] utilizes news 
stories and other open-source information gathering outlets to collect information about PII 
related cyber incidents. The ITAP model can capture large numbers of incidents as raw 
data and parse through to understand the vulnerabilities exploited, data that was breached, 
and steps taken by the bad actor to achieve their goal. ITAP accounts for cases after the 
year 2000 and can analyze trends in the types of cyber incidents as well as different sectors. 
The report further details the findings and visualizes it into different categories and trends 
such as impact of loss, demographics of victims, etc.  
Various other academic works use the ITAP Dataset to further research the PII 
assets, their risk of exposure, protection strategies, and minimizing risk [52-65]. 
Like we have seen in previous work, the ITAP report is published annually with all 
the aggregated information about incidents from the past year. Though it aids in visualizing 
the trends and patterns of cyber incidents in various market sectors, it fails to provide the 
information in a timely manner that can be incorporated by individuals and organizations 
alike and attempt to take any preventive actions to protect themselves from the attack. 
Moreover, with the given information, ITAP is not able to provide any explicit 
recommendations for prevention measures. 
WITHIN US: NON-ACADEMIC WORK IN INFORMATION SHARING 
Like ITAP, Verizon releases data breach reports with incidents that are related to 
its forensic and intelligence operations [28]. The incidents that are explained in the annual 
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Verizon report are shaped in the VERIS framework [29] – which is similar to the ATT&CK 
framework as described above – that standardizes the information extracted. Verizon’s 
report is very comprehensive because it can capture concrete steps, threat patterns, 
frequency, and the data compromised. Although the report does not focus primarily on PII 
data, the information capture and visualized can be of great aid to the public and market 
sector leaders in efforts of making their defenses more resilient. It should be noted that 
though they provide the general efforts for increasing defenses, the granularity is lost and 
not viewable for each incident captured. The report, based on the trends and other factors, 
releases general recommendations for security effort, but does not give any 
recommendation at an individual incident basis or even market sector basis. This, included 
with the fact that the data and trends are not provided on more frequent basis other than 
annual reporting, undermines the overall effort in utilizing the open data.  
Crowdstrike’s Global Threat Reports further details the specialized 2020 overview 
by focusing on the surge of new trends such as COVID-19 vaccine scams, data extortion, 
etc. [36]. With the 2020 pandemic, there has been a surge of remote workers due to the 
concerns for safety. Unfortunately, this also led to a high number of attacks due to remote 
authentication, the panic about the pandemic, and other uncertainties that were exploited 
by bad actors. The report further mentions how nation state actors played a role in targeted 
intrusions and what the reported adversaries were attributed to them. However, a 
significant contribution for intelligence sharing for cyber-defense sector comes from the 
report’s IOCs of different remote vulnerabilities. Through the collected intelligence, 
Crowdstrike can inform its audience about different stages of repetitive credential 
acquisitions as well as generate recommendations on how to protect an organization from 
it and all the other reported threats. Though generalized, the recommendations mimic 
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various mitigation techniques as seen in CISA alerts and MITRE ATT&CK framework, 
indicating versatility and easy application in the organization. However, the aggregation of 
all the collected data and creation of the report failed to deliver actionable intelligence to 
such organizations in timely manner. Though the intelligence was collected throughout the 
year, no recommendation or any other intelligence was publicly posted as part of the threat 
report in weekly or monthly manner. Delayed information always leads to a reactive 
response rather than proactive response. 
THREAT INTELLIGENCE COMPANIES 
There is a plethora of companies that address this domain issue of threat intelligence 
in forms of business models. Companies like Crowdstrike, IBM X-Force, Virustotal, etc. 
[30,31,32] have business models oriented towards gathering threat intelligence in all 
formats followed by digesting, analyzing, and reporting the information in timely manner 
















Table 1: Tables show a list of features for Virustotal and IBM X Force, respectively. 
It compares the features offered as part of their free services versus what the 
customer misses out by not opting in paid subscriptions [33]. Table 1 is not 




Paid Version: Virustotal 
Search based on IOCs  Yes Yes 
99% uptime for automation API No Yes 
Threat intelligence and recommendation 
notifications 
No Yes 








Search based on IOC Yes Yes 
Access machine-readable actionable 
intelligence 
No Yes 
Early warning threat notification No Yes 




Table 1 shows a non-exhaustive list of features that are offered by these threat intel 
services. It should be noted that the enterprise (paid) subscription comes with a lot more 
features than listed in Table 1. With the current subscription costs of such services being 
closer to ten thousand dollars per annum [34], smaller organizations can get isolated as 
they likely do not have the same budgets for cybersecurity as bigger organizations. Further, 
the budgeting of smaller enterprises tends to focus more on endpoint protection for reactive 
response rather than intelligence gathering for a proactive approach, as advised by the 
framework put out by CISA [35], leading to intelligence gathering be of lower priority and 
risk smaller organizations be a lucrative target for bad actors.  
With all the different efforts described – from around the globe to specific US 
solutions – they all fall short in their ability to provide an easily accessible platform or 
solution that enables organizations of any size to access the current trends and intelligence 
to understand emerging threats in their sector, as well as understand the appropriate 
response to prevent bad actor from intruding in their system. I-WARN aims to rectify that 
through providing such intelligence in timely manner thereby openly assist in making our 








Chapter 3:  System Overview 
This chapter covers the technical details for I-WARN. We will discuss all aspects 
of the backend logic as well as frontend integration.  
SYSTEM OVERVIEW 
I-WARN is designed to be a webpage that can be accessed by any device connected 
to the internet. We use Python 3.7 for the backend logic, ITAP dataset as input to the 
system, and Python Flask [42] coupled with HTML and JavaScript for the front end. More 
aspects of each part of the project are detailed below.  
On a high-level overview, The ITAP dataset is fed into a parser script where it is 
parsed to extract information elements, such as steps or inputs used by attackers during an 
incident, for the system to map a story to a specified ATT&CK threat tactic from the matrix 
through a scoring system. We discuss why we used ATT&CK matrix later. Once the 
information is collected, we create a score for each story to understand the more likely 
threat tactic utilized based on the inputs and steps taken by the attacker during an incident. 
Lastly, when the scores are created, we further extract the market sector and send over the 
details to an automation script for it to create a possible list of mitigation tactics. 
From there, the output is then fed into the Graphical User Interface (GUI) where it 
can display descriptions, mitigation tactics, and top threat tactics for each story. There are 
other features such as the CISA Alert feed also available from the GUI. Figure 3 gives a 




Figure 3: High-level overview of the system where the lifecycle of each story – from 
ITAP dataset to the frontend – is shown.  
 ITAP DATASET 
Each story in the ITAP dataset contains the inputs used by the attackers, the outputs 
of what the attackers were able to exfiltrate or utilize, and the steps they took to exploit 
vulnerabilities, conduct crimes of theft, fraud and abuse then ultimately to produce a wide 
range of consequences. Aside from such facts, every story also contains the resources used 
to conduct the attack, general biographical information about victims, any attribution to the 
attacker, and deployed countermeasures. Gathering of all the information indicates a very 
thorough study of each story and reaffirms every piece of intelligence which can be 
extracted.  
Currently, the ITAP dataset contains approximately 6000 stories gathered from the 
OSINT outlets, captured between the years 2000 and 2020. These stories are manually 
modeled1. Most of the stories contained in the ITAP dataset are related to identity-related 
crimes such as identity theft, social engineering, and phishing. The ITAP dataset also 
contains attacks such as Ransomware as they are related to further attacks caused by social 
engineering and phishing. Table 2 shows a snippet of the ITAP information contained for 
each story. 
 





Table 2: A snippet of the ITAP dataset with inputs, outputs, and steps taken by the 
bad actor. It also depicts the loss incurred by victims as well as 
countermeasures deployed. Aspects of counter measure with PII have been 
redacted. Information contained in the table for each story is not exhaustive. 




















[REDACTED] became aware 
of the attempt and immediately 
cancelled the fraudulent direct 
deposit accounts. The affected 


































malware removed, security 


































[REDACTED] was sentenced 
to 36 months in probation, 60 
hours of community service, 
$110,932.71 in restitution 
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MAPPING THREATS TO I-WARN 
We start the discussion of mapping logic with the utilization of MITRE ATT&CK 
framework [10]. Currently, ATT&CK framework is being utilized by actionable alerts 
provided by CISA [25], as well as by multiple non-federal information sharing [37,39]. 
The ATT&CK framework works well because of its simplicity in visualizing the lateral 
movement of possible attacks. With techniques, the ATT&CK framework also provides 
previous history of such uses and other attributional details, which can be used to further 
investigate by the organization’s security team. There are also possible detections provided 
for ways to assist blue teams in understanding how the attacker plans to use a point of entry 
and how they can look for IOCs. Mitigation tactics are also incorporated with each 
technique and helps the reader understand what steps can be taken to either prevent the 
attack at point of entry or mitigate any potential damage. With such eclectic set of 
information provided – and regularly updated – as part of OSINT, it was easier for us to 
integrate the ATT&CK framework in our work. Moreover, the relevance of the ATT&CK 
framework was also a key reason for us to use it. With the current US government alerts 
coming through the ATT&CK framework integration and given the fact that we aim to 
share information primarily in the US, it was vital to integrate our work with this current 
infrastructure. 
Next, we designed a logic map based on the keywords used in the ITAP dataset. 
The inputs and steps used in each story, as described in Table 2, give an overall picture 
about the incident that has taken place. Given that these stories were not entailing a lot of 
technical information, we had to manually parse through the keywords to associate them 
with threat tactics established in the ATT&CK framework. Since the stories are 
generalized, we decided to not attempt to not focus on threat techniques, but rather keep it 
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broader with threat tactics to avoid any risk of overfitting the ITAP dataset. Table 3 shows 
us the manual logic used for mapping keywords to threat tactics in the ATT&CK 
framework. 
To ensure keywords are captured correctly, we grouped many inputs to the proper 
keyword, reinforcing the logic as well as making it more simplistic when mapping to threat 
tactics. For example, we grouped inputs such as “Twitter”, “Facebook”, “social media” as 
Social Media Involvement. We collected and grouped all the ITAP inputs into 20 
keywords, as shown in Table 3.  
As mentioned before, the stories captured by ITAP are part of OSINT, thereby 
eliminating extensive technical details that can be incorporated in each. Given the stories 
are manually parsed and have been fully extracted, some contents of stories lead to 
ambiguity when it comes to pinpointing the exact threat tactic utilized by the bad actor. To 
counter that, we created a scoring system which assists in pinpointing the “most likely” 
threat tactics used. Since the generalization is something inevitable with OSINT 
(particularly media outlets) we overlap a few keywords – as seen in Table 3 – and give 
them a likely score of the possible threat tactics used. This ensures we can create a coverage 
that is adaptable as more stories are added, without risking to narrow results based on the 
specified 6000 stories.  
Once the ITAP dataset was parsed and each story is given a score for the most likely 
threat tactics used, we prune the MITRE matrix to eliminate unnecessary threat techniques, 
prior to providing mitigation tactics. Since the ITAP dataset is comprised of OSINT from 
media outlets, all the technical details described in the ATT&CK framework cannot be 
mapped to the stories. To eliminate this issue, we created a dictionary – part of which is 
shown in Figure 4 – to take out extremely technical threat techniques. We also eliminated 
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threat sub-techniques that stemmed from the said techniques. This way, we can filter out 
mitigation tactics that are not applicable to techniques which are never addressed in the 
ITAP dataset.  This is one the limitations of this work which will be discussed in later 
chapters. With the unwanted mitigation tactics and threat techniques eliminated, we map 
the remaining mitigation tactics to each threat tactic, and story, that generalizes all the 
possible steps an organization can take to limit or prevent any loss potentially incurred due 
to the attack.  
ORGANIZE MARKET SECTOR 
The ITAP dataset contains market sectors where each incident took place. 
However, due the specification provided in the ITAP dataset, we further generalized the 
market sector to aid in understanding of general trends. For instance, we grouped together 
market sectors containing the keyword “health”, “hospital”, “clinics”, etc. as healthcare. 
We grouped together all the market sectors of ~6000 stories into 12 market sectors. 11 out 
of 12 market sector keywords are readily mappable to known classification of market 
sectors, such as healthcare, religious organizations, etc. Out of the 11, 7 are classified to be 
part of the CISA Critical Infrastructure Sectors [23]. The remaining four are known sectors: 
education, religious organizations, hotels, and travel. The 12th one is meant to be 
miscellaneous – market sectors and companies that are not well known or do not fit in a 
generic sector – such as anonymous organizations, various companies grouped, clubs, etc. 
We classify organizations as miscellaneous if they cannot be grouped into the 11 other 
classifications. This information is collected and then passed on to be viewed on the GUI 
as discussed later in this chapter.  
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This separation of market sectors ensures that leaders of specified market sector 
can view generalized trends in their fields as well as explore the stories specific to their 
market sector. This would ensure they are able to filter out any noise related with other 
market sectors and take reactive or proactive measures based on the news, threat tactics, 





Figure 4: A snippet from the code showing the dictionary that is used to eliminate 



















Table 3: Table shows all the keywords from ITAP dataset used to create the scoring 
system. All inputs were grouped prior to mapping them to the threat tactics. 
More information about the overlaps can be found here: Link to Logic Map.  







“Break Into”, “Misplace”, 
“Mismanage” 
Resource Development 
"PII/Credential Stolen", "Synthetic 
Information" 
"Impersonate", "Compile", "Lie", 
"Communicate", "Alter" 
Initial Access 










"Malicious Link", "Malware", 
"Ransomware" 
"Breach", "Infect", "Coordinate" 
Persistence "Access Misuse" 
"Abuse", "Create", "Activate" 
 
Privilege Escalation "Access Misuse" "Abuse" 





Discovery NONE NONE 
Lateral Movement NONE NONE 
Collection 
"Audio/Visual Involvement", 
"Removable Media", "Email Scam"   
"Record", "Discover", "Find" 
Command and Control NONE NONE 
Exfiltration "Removable Media", "Transfer" 
"Inflict Punitive Measure", 
"Upload", "Steal", "Expose", 
"Sell", "Transfer", "Leak" 
Impact 
"Ransomware", "DDOS", "Video 
Altered" 
"Disable", "Destroy", "Block", 
"Deactivate", "Send", "Request" 
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COMBINING EXTRACTED INFORMATION 
Once the ITAP dataset is completely parsed and we successfully extracted market 
sector, we then combine all the information with ATT&CK mitigation tactics. Each threat 
tactic is linked with a list of mitigation tactics as recommended by the ATT&CK 
framework which are then grouped with each granular story.  
Since each story extracts top three threat tactics used in the incident, and each threat 
tactic has a mitigation tactic list linked to it, we attach the lists of these mitigation tactics 
which are associated with the threat tactics. However, for brevity, we only display the list 
for top threat tactic in each story. Displayed mitigation tactics are then hyperlinked with 
the MITRE website and displayed for the reader, further described later in the chapter. 
ADDITIONAL FEATURES 
In addition to the mapping and displaying of the stories and its associated mitigation 
recommendation from the ATT&CK framework, we also incorporate other, emergency 
alerts, such as CISA [25] to the GUI. Because the CISA alerts are published ready and 
integrated with the MITRE ATT&CK framework, adding the alerts was a vital feature to 
incorporate in I-WARN as it then offers itself as a hub to more intelligence – governmental 
and non-governmental alerts – that organizations can utilize from one location. As part of 
future works, we aim to expand and incorporate other open knowledge sharing systems as 
well.  





We use Flask for I-WARN due to the increased dependency of a web framework 
and the ease it offers to upload the project on platforms, like Amazon Web Services, when 
we are ready to publish. With Flask, we can set up our localhost to a specified port and 
view the GUI ourselves. Other debugging tools offered in the development environment 
also make it a lucrative choice.  
Figure 5 shows us the main homepage that a I-WARN user sees. We see the tabs 
of each market sector, as well as CISA alerts. Further, the homepage has an interactive pie 
chart that shows the current number of cases for each market sector. The pie chart is created 
using HTML and embedded JavaScript through Google charts as well as other sources for 
navigation bars [43, 66, 67] and is adaptable to more market sectors, should they be added 
in the future.  
Additionally, there is a table to show the most common threat tactics being utilized 
in each market sector, part of which is shown in Figure 5. On the backend, we calculate the 
frequency of each threat tactic in each market sector and list out the most frequent ones 
used for each market sector. We hope that these show the market sector leads common 
trends occurring in their fields and can act in preventing being a target. 
Diving deep into each sector, the stories are divided by the story number – which 
is a simple index that can be replaced with more specific names – followed by the top three 
threat tactics likely used in the story. These tables, like the homepage, are interactive [66] 
and can be clicked to get more information. When clicked, each story shows the description 
of the threat tactics in use, as well as the list of mitigation tactics for the top threat tactic 
(Figure 6). We create a list in the backend and hyperlink it to the MITRE website in case 
the reader wants more information about each mitigation tactic and how it relates to 
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different threat techniques, as seen with the blue text in the second picture (Figure 6). We 
also conduct a frequency analysis on all the mitigation tactics to give a priority mitigation 
suggestion based on the mitigation tactic which covers the most threat tactics used in each 
story, shown in Figure 6. Lastly, we provide an interactive table for the CISA alerts as well, 
as seen in Figure 7. The alerts are based on the current information issued by CISA 
regarding any threats they deem of interest, as well as the mitigation and detection tactics. 
Since the alerts are already integrated with ATT&CK framework, we do not hyperlink 
anything to the MITRE website. Each row gives a detailed description, detection, and 
mitigation suggestions for the alert. All the details are parsed through the XML file, sent 
through the CISA RSS feed.  















Figure 5: Snippet from the GUI. The first one shows the webpage, as well as the pie 
chart showing the number of cases in each market sector. The education 







Figure 6:  The image shows the granularity of each story, divided by each sector. Each 
story has the description for top threat tactics used as well as hyperlinked 




Figure 7: Image shows the CISA alert tab that also shows how much information each 




















Chapter 4:  System Testing 
In this chapter, we cover the qualitative testing for I-WARN by comparing it to the 
current delivery of publicly available mitigation systems. 
To ensure that our system stands as a functional intelligence sharing platform, we 
observe different platforms that are advertised as knowledge sharing systems and compare 
them to I-WARN in terms of information content, ease of access, etc.  
Given that there are different platforms utilized to disperse information, we divide 
our efforts into observing formal and informal systems. We define formal systems as 
dedicated webpages and portals that primarily serve to inform the public about cyber 
security incidents and their related information. Informal systems utilize other platforms 
(such as Twitter) to inform the public about incidents as well, however, do not contain 
similar amounts of information as formal systems. For instance, a government dedicated 
cyber security team would have a dedicated, formal webpage for such use whereas a 
blogpost for computer enthusiasts may occasionally post some information related to an 
incident. Table 4 summarizes the different systems and how they compare to I-WARN. We 
further detail these differences later in the chapter. We compare these systems with I-
WARN through the delivery style – how formally or informally a system posts information 
– followed by target audience. We also observe the general time it takes for an incident to 
be updated for these systems and if they further post any mitigation tactics related to the 
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We observe various formal systems that are used to deliver notifications about 
OSINT. This includes publicly available intelligence, as well as white reports from 
organizations.  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA): CISA, as described 
in Chapter 2, is the United States federal resource for alerting the public about 
cybersecurity incidents and related mitigation response. Through federal resources, they 
focus on incidents that are of national security interest as well as any incidents that target 
the Critical Infrastructures [23]. CISA collaborates with multiple partners in the federal 
and private cyber watch sectors to collect information.  
With the various integrations that I-WARN already has established, CISA is a good 
comparison. As seen in Figure 2, CISA alerts regarding persistent threats that endanger 
Critical Infrastructure Services comprise of the background of the alert, detection, and 
mitigation responses – all of which are extracted from the ATT&CK framework. 
Comparing the CISA alerts to Figure 5, we see that I-WARN derives all its information 
sharing content from the CISA alerts.  
Because each story is extracted from media outlets, I-WARN does not concern 
itself with given explicit background on each story under the assumption that an extensive 
coverage of the story has already been done. We plan on adding hyperlinks to each story 
as part of our future work. Looking at detection and mitigation tactics, I-WARN provides 
mitigation responses with the links to MITRE mitigation description for the reader to better 
understand how the mitigation tactic is integrated in their system. The links also serve as a 
bridge to further investigate what threat techniques are said to be mitigated from the 
recommendation. Because of the ease of access to the detection and mitigated techniques, 
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I-WARN compares well with CISA alerts because of the content they both share. Any 
reader should be able to get in-depth information about cybersecurity alerts available 
through media outlets through I-WARN in similar fashion of alerts of national security 
interest through CISA. 
Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC): We look at the Australian Cyber 
Security Centre alerts [44] as they annually release reports, seen in Chapter 2, to ensure 
their citizens and organizations understand cybersecurity trends and take general mitigation 
steps. Using their governmental resources and private partnerships, ACSC can monitor and 
collect information about various cyber threats. ACSC also allow citizens to directly 
complain about cyber incidents that are also registered in their system. Their alerts cater to 
various sectors such as government organizations, small business, and even individuals.  
From Figure 6, we observe that ACSC – like CISA – releases a brief description 
about the cybersecurity alert as well as mitigation response. Although it does not directly 
relate to the ATT&CK framework, the mitigation responses are guidelines to review for 
Indicator of Compromises and recommendation to prevent system intrusion. It should also 
be noted that the alerts common for Australia and the United States mimic the same 
mitigation responses and often ACSC would recommend reading the CISA mitigation 
tactics, as seen in Figure 6. Like ACSC, I-WARN ensures that the mitigation tactics are 
granular to each story and are hyperlinked to more details, so that they can be further 













Figure 8: Snippet from an alert posted by the ACSC [36] that shows the main 
components of these alerts: background, mitigation tactics, and additional 
information. It is also interesting to see a reference to CISA as part of their 
mitigation response to understand more about the given IOCs. We compare 
the alert to I-WARN and conclude that the content and style of delivery is 
similar.  
 
Center for Internet Security (CIS): Lastly, we compare I-WARN to non-
government formal systems such as the notification system of Center for Internet Security 
(CIS) [45]. A snippet of CIS’s alerts (Figure 7) indicates each alert is taken from CISA 
Traffic Light Protocol (TLP) White sources2. TLP White, according to CISA [46], indicates 
that the information shared is of public use and sharing with anyone, including any nation 
state, is permitted. CIS uses such sources to populate their alerts and use a similar fashion 
of alerting the public as recommended by CISA. One of their primary sources are 
 
2 This is based off the free alerts provided CIS. I-WARN does not compare itself to CIS subscription alerts 
as we do not have access to those. 
39 
 
advisories issued by Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) – records stored by 
MITRE.  
Figure 9: A small snippet of the alerts posted by CIS. The alerts give an overview of 
the advisory, currently affected systems as per the CVE, and mitigation 
responses. The content of each alert is like I-WARN since they focus on brief 
mitigation tactics and links for further, in-depth dive on each response. CIS, 
just like I-WARN, utilizes standard visualization and content delivery as 
federal and state agencies in the US.  
This indicates that the content of each alert is very similar to I-WARN, based on 
the incident described, as we mimic the contents provided by federal/state cybersecurity 
organizations. Given that CIS utilizes the same resources to populate its alerts, the content 
is very similar to I-WARN. Though some of the content comes from more technical 
OSINT, we believe that it is appropriate to compare our system due to the style of delivery. 
It should also be noted that although it curates the information from various sources, CIS 
does not create its own mitigation responses, but rather forwards the original ones posted 




When comparing I-WARN to all possible systems, it is imperative that informal 
systems are also considered since many channels of OSINT are derived through such 
platforms. 
Twitter: One of the most common information sharing platform which is not 
governed by a single entity or organization is Twitter. The social media is very versatile 
that can be used as part of OSINT, as well as a knowledge sharing platform. Various 
cybersecurity organizations send out tweets, for example Figure 8, that are not as organized 
as the formal systems discussed previously, but send out information about incidents in a 
timely manner.  
When looking at tweets from the perspective of information sharing, tweets do not 
contain all the content that systems such as I-WARN would. Given the almost-
instantaneous information sharing of tweets, organizations are not able to share all the IOCs 
and possible mitigation response in time as a tradeoff.  
The Hacker News on Twitter: We observed The Hacker News as part of our 
informal knowledge sharing [47]. The Hacker News is very active on Twitter in releasing 
information about cybersecurity events. For ease of access, they tag their tweets with 
#cybersecurity that makes the tweets grab attention for interested readers. Further, The 
Hacker News covers a diverse range of incidents which do not necessarily overlap with 
any government alerts as seen on ASCS or CISA. Because The Hacker News have their 
own cybersecurity researchers and journalists, they are able to invest in resources to collect 
information for domestic and international incidents.  
However, as discussed before (and seen in Figure 8), the tweets are shared in high 
frequency which does not give enough time for The Hacker News or any other independent 
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source to collect and analyze all the possible IOCs and give any mitigation 
recommendation. Although it is faster in delivery of intelligence, I-WARN contains more 





Figure 10: A tweet snapshotted from The Hacker News showing us information sharing 
through Twitter – part of OSINT. Although the information is informal and 
lacks all the contents of detection and mitigation tactics, as seen in CISA and 
I-WARN, the time of delivery is significantly lower due to its informal style 
of delivery.  
Independent sources on Twitter: Other informal sources posting information 
related to cybersecurity incidents and stories are independent sources and individuals that 
do not systematically hunt and post incidents. For instance, media outlets, such as Wall 
Street Journal (@WSJCyber), would inform the public about cyber security incidents.  
 
3 Does not include retweets by The Hacker News from other organizations. 
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However, their cyber news does not always cover incidents, but also politics that 
involve cyber news. This unreliability makes such sources a weak comparison against I-
WARN due to its dedicated approach to share OSINT and mitigation recommendations. 
Sources such as journalists and news media does not tweet about stories related to security 
incidents as often as the updated databases used by systems like ITAP. This results in the 
media tweet about cyber security and related policies, but does not overlap content or 
delivery time with I-WARN.  
Cyware: Other platforms that we compare I-WARN to are independent websites 
such as Cyware [48] that releases news about cybersecurity incidents and related policies. 
Cyware as a system is able to separate out news relating to incidents and policies, which 
makes it easier for the reader to access the content of their choosing.  
This compares well with I-WARN as it gives users the ability to choose the 
information they require from each sector. Further, since Cyware itself does not post the 
alerts, but rather links and highlights the alerts from different websites. It is a fast delivery 
system that can be monitored at a high frequency for any updates. A snippet of its platform 
can be seen in Figure 9. Since it links the readers to websites like The Hacker News, we 
see the same issue as described above: in the tradeoff for timely alerts, there is not enough 
information to analyze the IOCs for any detection or mitigation responses. Although 
websites like Cyware can deliver alerts and notifications faster than I-WARN, they do not 







Figure 11: Snippet of the website Cyware and its alerts and notifications for cyber 
incidents that are not related to policies. It should be noted that Cyware does 
not create these articles and only curates them. This results in Cyware linking 
other websites like The Hacker News that may not have all the information 
for a proactive or reactive response. 
Overall, I-WARN as a system can deliver the same content as the widely trusted 
sources – be it governmental or independent. The sources are pulled from the ITAP dataset 
that reads in stories from multiple sources, diversifying the pool as compared to 
governmental sources only. Further, the dedicated functionality of I-WARN enables it to 
share information based on technical details of the story and be available as a platform 
which can be accessed by devices connecting to other informal and formal systems. I-
WARN is culmination of the formal and informal sources features: it is a system that aims 







Chapter 5:  Future Work 
As we conclude our work, we highlight some plans for any future work.  
KEEPING THE SYSTEM OPEN-SOURCE AND LIVE 
One of the near-future goals for I-WARN is to be live and accessible by public-
facing internet. With the Python webhook developed, we are currently exploring options 
of Amazon Web Services through Elastic Beanstalk [51] due to its ease of pushing Python 
Flask webhooks. Through Beanstalk, we will be able to store the source code to an S3 
bucket and have an open connection to the webpage through port 80. Although security 
and having HTTPS traffic is vital and in consideration, our priority is to have a live page 
first. We will continue to explore other options in the realm of AWS to bring the application 
up and usable for the public.  
All in all, though I-WARN is a system that aids in turning OSINT into actionable 
intelligence, the system is far from perfect. With our step in the right direction, we hope to 
continue our work for the betterment of organizational defenses through gather more 
intelligence from around the globe, streamlining our pipelines from ITAP dataset to 
webpage using Machine Learning, using MITRE to its full ability, and bringing the system 
live for the world to view and use. These expectations would ensure that I-WARN is a 
relevant system when threat intelligence is discussed as a topic.  
COLLECTING INFORMATION FROM MORE SOURCES 
One of the planned, near future work for I-WARN is expanding the resource pool 
of OSINT gathered.  
Currently, I-WARN relies on information gather from various outlets for ITAP. 
Although it provides a versatile set of data for mitigation efforts to be displayed, we are 
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hoping to expand to add more sources and increase the information flow for the ITAP 
dataset to work with. Higher globalization and interconnectivity results in being connected 
to one part of the world, while sitting in at the other side. Although this globalization makes 
the world a smaller place for people to connect, unfortunately, it brings global threats to 
organizations or individuals’ Homefront as well.  
We plan on incorporating news sources from all over the globe, such as 9news from 
Australia [49], Economic Times from India [50], etc. It would ensure preventive measures 
are recommended based on threats which are not just currently present in the US, but also 
all around the world. With a broader scale of events being digested by I-WARN, readers 
for any sector will be able to better picture the shape of their market sector on a global scale 
and prepare their cybersecurity measures accordingly. Not only will they be able to focus 
on threats already occurring in the US, but also be able to proactively prepare themselves, 
if their organization has any open communication or any relation with countries of interest 
based on the ITAP dataset. With the location in mind, I-WARN aims to distinguish source 
of the story in addition to the distinguished sectors, giving the reader a better idea of where 
the incidents are occurring and if investing in mitigation recommendations is necessary for 
them. 
USING MACHINE LEARNING 
The current ITAP dataset has been manually parsed to extract all the information 
from each story. Although the process is very thorough, it leaves room for errors due to 
subjectivity and is in general very crude and cumbersome. Similarly, I-WARN logic 
mapping is manually integrated, leaving room for the same issues. As part of future work, 
we plan on utilizing the upcoming machine learning models to train on the current ITAP 
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dataset and logic such that keywords and inputs can be automatically extracted. With the 
addition of new sources, manually parsing through all stories will be rendered ineffective 
soon and use of ML is going to be imperative should ITAP and I-WARN keep digesting 
of new information on a very high frequency. The University of Texas’s Center for Identity 
is currently working on using ML to automate all capturing of needed information for the 
ITAP dataset. With the models, I-WARN will be able to integrate new stories and update 
its dashboard on a higher frequency, as the new information is fed in. Further, we aim to 
work on ML models for I-WARN to be able to incorporate newer keywords and inputs as 
the stories add more detail. This will especially be useful when synonymous for various 
keywords – such as “medical centre” instead of “hospitals” – can be seen in use for news 
sources in other parts of the world. It would also aid in incorporating different inputs which 
can be used for different threat techniques and tactics as new vectors for attack surface.  
Using ML, we can streamline the process of parsing through incoming sources, 
collecting inputs and steps taken by the bad actor, as well as map them to specified threat 
tactic and techniques. It will aid in fully narrowing down the mitigation recommendations, 
leveraging the full power of OSINT and benefitting the communities.  
INCORPORATING ALL MITRE TECHNIQUES 
One of the limitations discussed in Chapter 3 was the elimination of several 
techniques that could not be mapped to any stories in ITAP due to the lack of technical 
context in the current media outlets. With the increasing interdependence of information 
sharing and growing interest of cyber and information security in public and private 
organizations, we hope that OSINT retrieved from media outlets will start to provide more 
context on the technical details of various cyber incidents. Through the technical insights, 
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we would be able to incorporate the keywords retrieved into I-WARN’s scoring system 
and provide narrowed mitigation efforts for the different techniques being utilized by the 
bad actors.  
Due to the required efforts of organizations which I-WARN relies on, we keep this 
as an attainable goal for distant future. The needed evolvement of OSINT will require 
fundamental changes on media’s information sharing procedures, foreshadowing a long 
wait for the technical details to be shared in story. Regardless of the wait, it is an imperative 
work which needs to be incorporated whenever possible. As leaders in I-WARN’s covered 
sectors, all information collected to provide mitigation tactics can result in preventing their 
organizations suffer immeasurable or irreversible damage. The more threat techniques we 
















Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
This research project delivered I-WARN, an actionable identity threat intelligence 
and analysis tool with recommendations to mitigate and thwart threats, leveraging the 
integration of open sources (e.g., news media), the UT Center for Identity Threat 
Assessment and Prediction (ITAP) project data, and the MITRE ATT&CK framework. I-
WARN ensures leaders are better prepared for cyber threats observed in the community.  
Through different regulations around the globe and in the United States, 
information sharing is becoming a vital tool in keeping up with wide ranging, complex 
threat landscape. Especially within the US, agencies such as Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) aim to alert the public and organizations of any 
threats and incidents that aim at critical infrastructures or the nation and its security. 
Though CISA aims to provide actionable intelligence, the agency does not invest in 
preventing lesser-known, domestic threats that affect business – small or large – and 
individuals alike.  
I-WARN aims to fill that gap to analyze and report on emerging threats from a wide 
range of market sectors and incorporate the MITRE ATT&CK framework mitigation 
tactics to create actionable intelligence and proactively thwart threats instead of reacting 
after an attack. Through I-WARN, organizations of any scale can proactively get 
information about cyber incidents, their market sector’s trends, and possible mitigation 
efforts. I-WARN fills the intelligence void of delivering actionable intelligence in a timely 
manner with formats and content that is easily understood by the organizations and 
leadership. 
Using ITAP dataset, I-WARN can utilize openly available information, such as 
inputs and steps used by attackers, to map them with the current ATT&CK framework that 
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enables getting actionable data for readers and leaders of various market sectors. It is 
incredible to see how trivial information received from various media outlets, like 
blogposts and articles, can be turned in a power tool to better the defenses of organizations.  
Through the system, I-WARN can take stories of various incidents, like as with 
phishing incidents, in which the attackers intrude a target system, pair them to the 
ATT&CK framework to understand the various threat tactics used, and create a list of 
mitigation tactics to recommend defenders thwart the attacks at various lateral movement. 
I-WARN aids in collecting such intelligence from stories that enable leaders in such market 
sectors to understand the technicalities of an attack from an informal source and ensure that 
their defenses are on par to tackle these threats should they be faced with a similar incident.  
Threat Intelligence is one of the strongest tools a cyber-defending team has in its 
arsenal. In the battle between attackers and defenders, attackers bring the advantage of 
weaponizing new vulnerabilities that defenders must reactively respond to. With threat 
intelligence aiding the defenders to proactively know about a threat, we hope that I-WARN 
delivers a significant advantage to the defenders by increasing the actionable intelligence 
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